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Security in a City Wide Testing Program 
Anthony J. Polemeni, Ph.D. 
In April 1974, a brouhaha erupted over the admin-
istration of the New York Citywide Reading Test and, 
as a result, the entire testing program had to be re-
structured. All students in grades 2 through 9 in the 
public schools had taken the test according to a man-
date of the New York State Legislature. Unfortunately, 
copies of the test had fallen into the hands of news-
casters and newspaper reporters prior to the adminis-
tration of the test. The allegation was made that 
students, teachers, and parents also had prior access 
to the tests and the results, therefore, were invalid. 
As a consequence of all this, an investigation was 
launched into what were termed irregularities in the 
testing program. It was determined that in a few 
schools the actual test booklets had been used for 
coaching purposes and, while the overall impact had 
no perceptible influence on the citywide mean grade 
scores, public confidence in the use of "shelf-item" 
standardized tests was effectively destroyed. 
The situation was grave for three reasons: In 
the first place, the results of the Citywide Reading 
Test are used for the placement of pupils in compensa-
tory and special education programs and as one basis 
for the rete~tion and promotion of pupils--a matter of 
tremendous concern to parents. 
Secondly, the Citywide Test results are used to 
rank all schools in the City of New York on the basis 
of reading performance. Obviously, there is a good 
deal of pride involved on the part of teachers and 
principals within each school, and the notion of one's 
placement in the ranking being depressed through chi-
canery on the part of another would be most offensive. 
Finally, but importantly, was the reputation of 
60,000 New York City public school teachers to be 
maligned because 6 or 12 of their number had acted 
foolishly? 
In the face of these problems, New York City had 
only two options: Scuttle the Citywide Testing Program 
altogether, or develop a strategy for the administra-
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tion of a secure test--a test never before available 
in the marketplace, and never before administered ex-
cept for norming purposes. 
The dilemma gave rise to a series of high-level 
conferences to ensure that the matter be handled to 
the satisfaction of everyone involved. The serious 
nature of the problem was recognized: One assistant 
principal had been demoted, and several teachers had 
been officially reprimanded as a result of the scandal. 
No one wanted a repetition. In the final analysis, 
since a Citywide Reading Test score is necessary for 
a variety of purposes--including evaluation, alloca-
tion of funds, and administrative decision making--
New York City chose to go with a secure testing pro-
gram. It was understood, universally, that all proce-
dures had to be so carefully defined that there could 
be no hint of improper practices. Such was the pro-
gram that was developed in New York City. 
Since that time, several of the major cities in 
the United States have contacted New York City because 
they were encountering the same problems and wanted to 
know how New York had set up its program to ensure 
against irregularity, and allegation of irregularity. 
Since the replies were sketchy at best, and since in-
creasing numbers of school systems throughout the 
country can anticipate similar problems, it was felt 
that a do-it-yourself-kit for security in a Citywide 
Testing Program might find a responsive readership. 
Such is the purpose of this article, and what follows 
is a step-by-step description of what was done by the 
Office of Educational Evaluation in New York City: 
1. An application for pre-qualification as a bidder 
on the New York Citywide Testing Program was 
sent to 38 of the largest test publishing com-
panies in the United States. Included in the 
documentation sent to the publishers were the 
general requirements for the tests, the answer 
documents, and the manuals. One stipulation of 
the pre-qualifying application read as follows: 
"The test shall be 'secure' in that it shall 
not be, nor ever have been, available to the 
public." To ensure against charges of favorit-
ism, at the same time that the applications were 
sent to the 38 publishers, a public advertise-
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ment was placed in the City Record soliciting 
bids on the secure reading test. 
2. In all, seven replies were received. Of these, 
five said they could not meet the requirements 
and specifications. One company said they had 
a secure test available, but the norms would not 
be available before September 1975. This would 
have been too late to meet Office of Educa-
tional Evaluation time lines. Only one company 
replied that it had a secure standardized test 
available and normed, and could meet all stipu-
lated requirements. 
3. The Director of the Office of Educational Evalu-
ation, the Coordinator of Citywide Testing, and 
a specialist in the New York City reading cur-
riculum met with the publishers of the test to 
ascertain that the test was valid for New York 
City pupils, and that its reliability coeffi-
cient was acceptable. The tests were brought 
to the meeting by the publisher's representative, 
examined by Board of Education personnel, and 
removed by the publisher's representative. 
4. At no time prior to the actual delivery of the 
tests by the publisher to the district deposi-
tories did any official or staff member of the 
Board of Education keep a copy of the test in 
his possession. The purpose of this precaution 
was to ensure that should a leak occur it would 
be the responsibility of the publisher rather 
than of the Board of Education . 
5. The title of the test was changed to the New York 
City Reading Test and it was reprinted by the 
publisher under maximum security procedures. 
These procedures included an actual count of 
each sheet of paper run through the printing 
press, and the shredding of all misprinted 
sheets. 
6. Prior to the delivery of the tests to the dis-
tricts, the Community School Superintendent 
within each district was required to select a 
depository to hold the testing materials for 
all schools within that district. It was made 
abundantly clear that security of the materials 
during the time they were in the district 
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depository was the responsibility of the Commu-
nity Superintendent and that the depository, 
therefore, must be kept locked or manned at all 
times. 
Compliance with all requests was maximal, since 
no one wanted a repetition of the furor that had 
accompanied the 1974 administration of the test-
ing. 
7. After a depository had been selected for each 
district, a staff member of the Office of Educa-
tional Evaluation visited each one to confinn 
.~ that it was, in fact, secure, and that it was 
large enough to acconunodate the materials and 
the personnel to distribute them. It might be 
noted, too, that all depositories had to be on 
the ground floor, or accessible by freight ele-
vator, in order that the trucker not be delayed 
in his schedule. (The entire delivery to the 
32 districts, for the 1000 schools, had to be 
made in two days in order that there be minimum 
opportunity for the booklets to go astray.) 
8. To man the depositories, each district provided 
two people (in most cases, the reading coordina-
tor and the math coordinator) and the Office of 
Educational Evaluation provided one staff member. 
The function of these personnel, in the deposi-
tories, was to check the exact amount of mate-
rials delivered by the trucker, and to distrib-
ute these materials to school representatives. 
9. As the school representatives arrived to pick up 
the materials, they had to present a "School Re-
gister As Of Date Of Testing." The purpose of 
this was to ensure that each school received no 
more materials than were necessary at the time. 
(The bulk printing order had been based on the 
October registers, and these figures had changed 
by April.) 
10. Once the material for a school had been picked 
up, and until that material was actually returned 
to the test depository following completion of 
the test, its security was the responsibility of 
the school principal. 
11. The test materials were picked up by the schools 
one day prior to the test set for test adminis-
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tration. This was necessary in order that there 
be time for distribution of the material to the 
teachers, and tilne for the teacher to fill in 
the identification grids. In most cases, the 
principal called a special staff conference on 
the afternoon of the day prior to test adminis-
tration so that teachers might be properly in-
structed in the use, coding, packaging, and 
labeling of the materials. 
12. All tests, in all second through ninth grade 
classes, in all public schools in New York City, 
were administered on the same day. No excep-
tions were permitted. Those students who were 
absent on the day of the test were retested at 
a later date with a diffe~ent form of the test. 
The scores of these retested students, while 
they were given to teachers for classroom use, 
were not entered in the statistical analysis of 
the Citywide Reading Survey. 
13. During the time of test administration, staff 
members of the Office of Educational Evaluation 
made unannounced visits to approximately 75 
schools throughout the city. These visits were 
unannounced only in the sense that no school 
knew whether or not it would be visited; all 
schools had been put on notice that such moni-
toring would occur on a random basis. No re-
presentative of the Office of Educational Eval-
uation.recorded any untoward incident during 
these visits to the schools. 
14. Every teacher had to submit an answer document 
for every student on register as of the testing 
date. The answer document had to be coded as 
either "tested," "absent," or "excused as non-
English speaking." A student could be excused 
as non-English " ... who in the opinion of the 
school cannot reasonably be expected to read or 
understand test content because of language-
related difficulties." Pupils in CRMD, junior 
guidance, health conservation, or visually hand-
icapped classes were not included in the testing 
program at all, since they were not on regular 
class register. 
15. Immediately following the test administration 
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each teacher wrapped and labeled (separately) 
the answer documents, the used test booklets, 
and the unused test booklets and teacher manuals. 
These packages were then sent to the principal's 
office. No remnant of the testing materials was 
to remain in the classroom of any teacher. 
16. When the testing materials from each classroom 
had been gathered in the principal's office, 
they were returned to the district test deposi-
tory where a receipt was issued. Again, no 
remnant of the testing program was to remain 
in any school. 
17. On the first or second day following the test 
date (and during which time the depositories re-
mained manned or locked), the materials were 
picked up by the trucker--in the presence of an 
Office of Educational Evaluation representative--
and shipped to the scoring centers. 
18. While the tests were being scored, the test pub-
lisher began work on the development of a paral-
lel form of the test for administration in 1976. 
That test will be, or has been (depending on 
whether this report appears in print before or 
after March 30, 1976) administered under exactly 
the same security procedures described above 
since, as a result of the security procedures, 
there was not a single allegation of irregular-
ity during or following the entire testing pro-
gram. 
In summary then, New York City when faced with 
the problem of developing a secure citywide test de-
veloped a strategy and solved the problem. Great for 
New York City! But now a very pointed question: Sup-
posing another large city--or 6, or 12, or 20 large 
cities--wants to replicate the New York City strategy. 
Where do all the "secure" tests come from? 
This is a question for the major test publishers 
to answer. It is likely, in the light of the New York 
City experience, that they have already begun working 
on the answer. Test publishers are in business to make 
money; they must provide what the consumer demands. If 
the questions addressed to New York City (which this 
article has attempted to answer) are a portent, then 
ever-increasing numbers of consumers will be demanding 
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secure tests. 
The consumer, for his part, must be willing to 
pay a price for the security of his testing program. 
New York City, for example, paid $129,300.00 in de-
velopmental costs for the 1976 version of its Citywide 
Reading Test. This is a lot of money at any time; it 
is a tremendous amount of money in this day of shrink-
ing educational budgets. 
Perhaps what is needed is the formation of an ad-
hoc "think-tank" composed of Chief School Officers, 
Heads of Evaluation, and fiscal and technical experts 
from the major test publishing companies throughout 
the United States. 
If citywide testing is to continue, then educa-
tors, parents, and students have enough to worry about 
in terms of validity and culture-fairness. They 
should not have the additional concern that test re-
sults are invalid because the testing program itself 
was not secure. 
